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Abstract 
For cost-effective prototyping, system designers should 
have a clear understanding of the intended use of the proto-
type under development. This paper describes a classifica-
tion of formal specification (temporal) assertions used dur-
ing system prototyping. The classification introduces two 
new classes of assertions in addition to the well-known 
class of test-time assertions: (i) assertions used only during 
simulation, and (ii) deployable assertions integrated with 
run-time control flow. Separating the formal specification 
into three distinct classes allows system designers to de-
velop more effective prototypes to evaluate the different 
system behaviors and constraints.   A prototype of a naval 
torpedo system is used to illustrate the concept. 
1 Introduction 
The analysis and design of complex safety-critical embed-
ded systems pose many challenges. Feasible timing and 
safety requirements for these systems are difficult to formu-
late, understand, and meet without extensive prototyping. 
Traditional timing analysis techniques are not effective in 
evaluating time-series temporal behaviors  (e.g. the maxi-
mum duration between consecutive missed deadlines must 
be greater than 5 seconds). This kind of requirements can 
only be evaluated through execution of the real-time sys-
tems or their prototypes. Rapid prototyping also helps sys-
tem designers formulate and evaluate safety requirements of 
the system under development, by building two separate 
models (one for the system under development and the 
other for the environment (or equipment) under its control) 
and then exercising the two models in tandem to see if the 
simulation ends up in known hazardous states under normal 
operating conditions and under various failure conditions 
[AL].  
Run-time Execution Monitoring of formal specification 
assertions (REM) is class of methods of tracking the tempo-
ral behavior of an underlying application. REM methods 
range from simple print-statement logging methods to run-
time tracking of complex formal requirements (e.g., written 
in temporal logic) for verification purposes [D3]. Recently, 
NASA used REM for the verification of flight code for the 
Deep Impact project [DW]. Also recently, the U.S. Ballistic 
Missile Defense System has adopted REM as the primary 
verification method for the new ballistic missile battle man-
ager because of its ability to scale, and its support for tem-
poral assertions that include real-time and time series con-
straints [CDMSS]. In [DS], we showed that the use of run-
time monitoring and verification of temporal assertions, in 
tandem with rapid prototyping, helps debug the require-
ments and identify errors earlier in the design process. For 
cost-effective prototyping, the system designers should have 
a clear understanding of the intended use of the prototype 
under development. 
Published REM methods typically use temporal logic as a 
specification language [D2, HR]. Traditionally, run-time 
verification methods have been used in later stages of the 
design process, to validate and debug code that has already 
been written. Correctness assertions of interest were created 
for the purpose of REM-based testing or for model check-
ing, in other words they were test-time assertions. Based on 
our previous research on the use of REM in rapid prototyp-
ing via modeling and simulation [DM] and in fortifying 
target software’s exception-handling ability [D1], we pre-
sent in this paper two additional classes of assertions: (i) 
assertions that are used only during simulation, and (ii) de-
ployable assertions integrated with the run-time control flow 
of the target software. Separating the formal specification 
into three distinct types allows system designers to develop 
more effective prototypes to evaluate the different system 
behaviors and constraints.  We will illustrate these different 
classes of assertions and their intended use with an example 
prototype of a naval torpedo system using the OMNeT++ 
prototyping environment [Va] and the DBRover REM tool 
[D3].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a short introduction to temporal logic. Section 3 gives 
an overview of an autonomous homing torpedo control 
software prototype developed using the OMNeT++ tools. 
Section 4 illustrates the different kinds of assertions using 
torpedo control software example and discusses their impli-
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cations on the prototype design. Section 5 shows how these 
assertions can be evaluated using the OMNeT++ prototyp-
ing environment and the DBRover REM tool, and section 6 
draws the conclusion. 
2 Temporal Logic  
Temporal Logic is a special branch of modal logic that in-
vestigates the notion of time and order. Linear-time Tempo-
ral Logic (LTL) is an extension of propositional logic 
where, in addition to the well-known propositional logic 
operators, there are four future-time operators (-
Eventually,  -Always, U-Until, -Next) and four dual-past 
time operators. Pnueli [Pn] suggested using LTL for reason-
ing about concurrent programs. Since then, several re-
searchers have used LTL to state and measure correctness 
of concurrent programs, protocols, and hardware (e.g., [MP, 
Pn]). Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) was suggested by 
Chang, Pnueli, and Manna as a vehicle for the verification 
of real time systems [CP]. MTL extends LTL by supporting 
the specification of relative-time and real-time constraints. 
With MTL, all four LTL future-time operators can be char-
acterized by relative-time and real-time constraints specify-
ing the duration of the temporal operator. Temporal Logic 
with Time Series constraints (MTLS) was suggested by 
Drusinsky as an extension of MTL which enables temporal 
specifications that assert about time-series properties such 
as stability, monotonicity, and min-max values [D2]. For 
example, the following automotive cruise control code with 
a stability assertion (using embedded TemporalRover syn-
tax [D3]) requiring speed to be 5% stable while cruise is set 
and not changed: 
void cruise(boolean cruiseSet, boolean cruiseChange,  
boolean cruiseOff, boolean cruiseIncr, int speed) { 
… /* Cruise Controller functionality */ 
/* TRBegin 
TRAssert{Always ({cruiseSet} => 
    {speed*0.95 < speed’ &&  speed’ < speed*1.05}  
         Until $speed$ {cruiseChange || cruiseOff})} 
=> {…} // user actions 
TREnd */ 
In the example speed is a temporal data variable, which is 
associated with the Until temporal operator. This associa-
tion implies that every time the Until operator begins its 
evaluation, possibly in multiple instances (due to non-
determinism), the speed value is sampled and preserved in  
the speed variable of this instance of the Until; this value is 
referred to as the pivot value for this Until node instance. 
Future speed values used by this particular evaluation of the 
Until statement are referred to using the prime notation, i.e., 
as speed’; these future instances of the speed variable are 
referred to as primed values. Hence, if the speed value was 
100Km/h when cruiseSet is true, then the pivot value for 
speed is 100, while every subsequent speed is referred to as 
speed’ and must be within 5% of the pivot speed value. 
3 Autonomous Torpedo System Prototype 
We shall illustrate the concepts with the real-time control 
software of an autonomous homing torpedo, called KTorp. 
KTorp is a submarine-launched torpedo that searches, 
tracks and destroys its underwater targets. The torpedo con-
sists of five main sections (Sonar, Warhead, Battery, Con-
trol and Engine) and can operate in any sea conditions. It 
has a maximum navigation time limit of 35 minutes at 30 
knots, a navigation depth between 35 feet and 2500 feet, 
and two search modes. A torpedo run consists of three se-
quential phases: Enable, Search and Attack. The torpedo is 
in its Enable phase when it leaves its mother ship. The tor-
pedo is disarmed and its sonar is inactive, so that it will not 
be able to attack its mother ship. The torpedo will follow a 
straight path until it reaches its enable distance. The torpedo 
then enters its Search phase and starts searching for its tar-
get with the predefined algorithm according to its search 
mode. When the torpedo finds its target, it enters its Attack 
phase and attacks with a predetermined specification ac-
cording to its search mode. 
3.1 KTorp Prototype 
The torpedo prototype was created in two phases using the 
OMNeT++, an object-oriented discrete-event simulator 
primarily designed for the simulation of communication 
protocols, communication networks and traffic models, and 
models of multiprocessor and distributed systems.   Phase I 
concentrates on the modeling of torpedo subsystem behav-
ior while phase II expands and refines the environment 
model to capture the events and responses between the tor-
pedo and its environment. Phase II is needed for the verifi-
cation of the simulation-time and run-time assertions. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the OMNeT++ model for the Phase I 









Figure 1. The Phase I KTorp OMNeT++ Model 
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Figure 2. The OMNeT++ User Interface of the  
Phase I KTorp Simulation
The KTorp model is made up of four modules: 
1.  The Environment Model module provides a simplified 
model of the underwater environment, which is a com-
plex, dynamic environment that varies according to the 
weather condition, seasons, and regional differences. We 
assume that the environment consists of two types of 
signals (target signals and false echo signals) that are de-
tectable by the transceiver device of the torpedo. The 
target signals come from a real target and consist of mul-
tiple signals repeated at regular interval. The false echo 
signals, although very similar to the target signals, differ 
from the target signals in the number of signals and in 
the frequency they are generated.  
2. The Transceiver module models the transceiver device 
situated in the front of the torpedo. We assume that the 
device is a passive device in this model, i.e. it only re-
ceives signals. To make the simulation more realistic, 
the device uses the location data from the KTorp module 
to filter out input signals that are more than 1000 yards 
away from the torpedo. This device has some precision 
and reliability. The reliability of the device will be mod-
eled using probability based on the input parameters en-
tered by the system designer at the beginning of a simu-
lation run.   
3. The Internal Event and Fault Generator module pro-
vides an abstraction of the sensors inside the torpedo: (i) 
a small device called the Enabler responsible for detect-
ing that the torpedo is at the end of the Enable phase and 
sending an “Enable Signal” to the control logic to arm 
itself and begin its search for the target, and (ii) an Iner-
tial Measuring Unit (IMU) responsible for measuring the 
distance that KTorp traveled. The Enabler uses the data 
generated by the IMU to decide if the torpedo reaches 
the enable distance from the mother ship. 
4. The KTorp module models the control logic of the tor-
pedo.
4 Test-time, Run-time, and Simulation-
time Assertions in the Torpedo Prototype 
Requirements analysts typically start their requirements 
discovery process based on some scenarios involving the 
system and its environment, and express their understanding 
of the expected behavior or properties of the system infor-
mally with natural languages. Mission-essential and safety 
critical functional and non-functional requirements are then 
expressed as formal assertions to improve the requirements’ 
clarity and precision.  System designers take the require-
ments (expressed either in natural languages or as formal 
assertions) and create design artifacts of a system meeting 
the requirements. They may annotate the design artifacts 
with some of the assertions obtained in the requirements 
phase and add new assertions to express the important 
properties specific to the system being built. When the pro-
grammers map the system design to code, they may embed 
some of the formal assertions in the design artifacts into the 
code and may add more assertions to specify the correct 
behavior of the code modules for test automation or run-
time exception detection. Depending on the intended and 
potential use of these requirements, design and code asser-
tions in REM, we can classify them into the following three 
different classes. 
4.1 KTorp Safety Requirements and Test-time 
Assertions 
It is important for safety-critical systems like KTorp to be-
have properly even under abnormal or erroneous condi-
tions. Many of these safety-critical behaviors are expressed 
in formal assertions intended for testing the correctness of 
the design and/or implementation. The following are test-
time assertions for the torpedo. 
1. If the torpedo reaches its maximum navigation time 
limit (35 minutes) and still unable to find its target, the 
torpedo should never explode. Therefore the power to 
the warhead section must be cut and the torpedo will be 
disarmed. The MTL for this assertion is:  
Rule 1:  Always (launch => Eventually >=35 min (
live => Eventually <2 sec disarmed)).
2. The torpedo should never explode before it reaches its 
enable-distance from the mother ship (600 yards).  Let 
IMUdist denote the distance traveled by the torpedo as 
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computed by its IMU unit based on measured time, the 
MTL for this assertion is:  
Rule 2: (Not explode) Until (IMUdist>=600).
This assertion has a simulation-time variant described 
in section 4.2. 
3.  The torpedo should never navigate above 35 ft. The 
MTL for this assertion is:  
Rule 3:  Always (depth > 35 ft).
4.  Once the torpedo reaches a depth below 2000 ft, it 
should disarm within 2 seconds. The torpedo may re-
arm once it rises back up to 2000 ft. However, if the 
torpedo reaches a depth below 2500 ft, it should be 
permanently disarmed within 2 seconds. MTL for these 
assertions is: 
Rule 4a: Always (depth>2000 => 
Eventually<2 sec disarmed). 
Rule 4b: Always (depth>2500 => 
Eventually<2 sec (disarmed &&  
  Not Eventually armed)).
4.2 KTorp Simulation-time Assertions  
A simulation-time assertion is an assertion that uses infor-
mation about the environment not present in run-time. Con-
sider, for example, assertion #2 above. Distance in the tor-
pedo is computed by the IMU unit based on measured time. 
It is therefore an estimated distance. The simulator on the 
other hand, contains the actual distance of the torpedo from 
the mother ship; we denote this distance as ActualDist.
Consequently, the following is a simulation assertion vari-
ant of assertion #2: “The torpedo should never explode if  
ActualDist<600 yards”, written in MTL as
Rule 5:  (Not explode) Until (ActualDist >=600).
Note that rule #5 is an example of an assertion about the 
raw requirements, while rule #2 is an example of an asser-
tion about the design that uses a particular algorithm to es-
timate distance traveled based on time. Both rules are active 
during simulation. By choosing a less accurate algorithm for 
the IMU unit, we have recreated a simulation scenario 
where rule #5 fails and rule #2 succeeds. Such a scenario 
identifies an issue that would probably not have been de-
tected during testing using only information available to the 
torpedo software: there was a potential for the torpedo ex-
ploding while not sufficiently far from the mother ship. The 
discovery will cause the system designer to set tighter con-
straints on the accuracy of the IMU software.
4.3 KTorp Run-time Assertions 
Run-time assertions are assertions that are integrated with 
the run-time control flow of the application. Consider for 
example, if the torpedo toggles between 2100 ft and 2300 ft 
for 3 times or more within a 60-second interval then it is 
prudent to assume that there is something suspicious about 
the torpedo’s behavior. Consequently, the torpedo should be 
permanently disarmed. The formal assertion (using the 
time-series constraints of [D2]) is: 
Rule 6:  Not Eventually $time$ Repeated>2 
    depth<=2100 && Next (depth>2300 && 
    time’<time+60). 
An action associated with the failure of this assertion will 
permanently disarm the torpedo. Rule 6 is an example of a 
requirements assertion that finds its way into the target 
code. Assume that we implement the system in Java. The 
exception handling with temporal logic will be done as fol-
lows. 
(1) Express the assertion using embedded TemporalRover 
syntax [D3]: 
/* TRBegin 
TRAssert {Not Eventually $time$ Repeated_>2_ ( 
depth<=2100 && Next (depth>2300 && 
 time'<time+60)) }  
=> {$ // empty success action 
throw new MyException("Rule 6 failed");  $$} 
 TREnd */ 
(2) In the target Java code at the location requiring run-time 
checking, wrap the assertion inside a try block and in the 
catch block do: 
catch (MyException e) { 
 ... recovery action to disarm the torpedo 
}
(3) Implement the desired exception handling routines in 
the class MyException. 
4.4 Implications of Assertion Classification on 
Prototyping 
Testing is a time- and effort-consuming process. Correct 
formal specification of system requirements (simulation-
time assertions) and assertions describing the correct behav-
ior of control flow (test-time assertions) are essential to test 
automation. The use of REM, in tandem with rapid proto-
typing, provides an effective means to validate the correct-
ness of the formal specifications as well as the system de-
sign. 
Test-time assertions help develop built-in test cases in the 
design and implementation of the system prototype, and can 
be embedded in the prototype as probes (code snippets) to 
support REM. The effectiveness of these lightweight formal 
methods depends heavily on the designer’s ability to under-
stand the requirements and to express them correctly as a 
formal specification. Prototyping allows designers to valida-
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tion these test-time assertions early in the development 
process.   
The validation of system behavior requires the development 
of executable environment models to exercise the system 
prototype under realistic scenarios. Simulation-time asser-
tions hold the key in deriving the requirements for these 
environment models. Moreover, the environment may need 
to undergo constant changes to cope with the evolution of 
the prototype. Rapid system prototyping allows the con-
struction and modification of these executable environment 
models rapidly, accurately, and cheaply.  
Run-time assertions help increase the robustness of the sys-
tem software by armor-plating them against any unexpected 
behaviors. For example, we can fortify the software’s ex-
ception-handling ability via runtime monitoring of temporal 
assertions, where formal specifications are translated by a 
code generator into C, C++, or Java statements to be de-
ployed for catching exceptions in the final product during 
runtime [D1]. The effectiveness of the run-time assertions 
can only be validated via prototyping, where system design-
ers can inject faults into the system prototype and abnor-
malities into the operating environment to test the effective-
ness of the exception handlers.  
5 Runtime Monitoring and Checking of 
the Assertions 
To analyze the safety requirements involving the torpedo in 
the context of various actors in its environment, we added a 
DBRover Connector module and further refined the Envi-
ronment Model module, resulting in the OMNeT++ simula-
tion model shown in Figure 3, with the User Interface 











Figure 3. The Phase II KTorp OMNeT++ Model
Figure 4. The OMNeT++ User Interface of the  
Phase II KTorp Simulation 
The new environment model allows the system designer to 
evaluate the correctness of the transceiver algorithms in 
discerning signals from the three separate modules which 
model the Mother Ship, the Target and the Noise of the
environment, and the safety requirements involving the lo-
cations, headings and speeds of the torpedo, the mother ship 
and the target. 
The DBRover Connector module receives the IMUdist val-
ues from the Internal Event and Fault Generator module 
and the depth values as well as the arm and explode status 
from the KTorp module, executes the code snippets gener-
ated by DBRover to evaluate the Boolean conditions of the 
rule segments and sends the result to the DBRover Run-
time Monitor for real-time temporal rule verification (Fig-
ure 5). It also uses the feedback from DBRover to perma-
nently disarm the torpedo if Rule 6 is violated.  
We also modified the internal code of Internal Event and 
Fault Generator and the KTorp modules to provide the op-
tion of random fault generation based on the input parame-
ters entered by the system designer at the beginning of a 
simulation run.   
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Figure 5. Architecture of the integrated OMNeT++ Simulator / 
DBRover Run-time Monitor System 
6 Conclusions
While formal specification assertions are becoming increas-
ingly popular, they are typically used only in two configura-
tions: (i) for testing, using propositional or temporal asser-
tions, and (ii) in run-time, using propositional assertions 
(e.g., using the Java assertion feature). In this paper we 
showed the benefit of identifying temporal assertions for 
run-time and simulation time purposes. In particular, simu-
lation-time assertions are very useful for the development of 
the executable environment model, which is quite often 
neglected in traditional prototyping. Run-time assertions, 
together with run-time monitoring and exception handling, 
help increase the robustness of the system under develop-
ment. Prototyping is essential for testing the effectiveness of 
the run-time assertions. We also use a simple prototype to 
show how to instrument a simulation environment to sup-
port the evaluation of the temporal assertions as well as the 
system design. 
This paper also highlights the need for new prototype use-
cases pertaining to the above-mentioned classification. For 
example, prototypes used with simulation assertions will 
often be used to force catastrophic behavior of the kind only 
available in simulation mode. Similarly, prototypes used 
with run-time assertions will often be used under illegal 
contractual circumstances, forcing assertion-based flow-
control recovery.  
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